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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wagner appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his post-
conviction petition. On appeal Wagner claims his guilty plea was not knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently made due to the ineffective assistance of his trial 
counsel. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A grand jury indicted Wagner on three counts of Lewd Conduct with a 
Minor Under Sixteen. (Supp. R., pp. 22-24. 1) The indictment covered several 
months during which M.P., the victim, was between the ages of 7 and 8. (Id.) 
Wagner was M.P.'s uncle. (Supp. R., p. 57.) Wagner had a job cleaning laundry 
mats. (Id.) Wagner, M.P., and M.P's father would drive to the laundry mats at 
night. (Id.) M.P.'s father would stay in the car and M.P. would help Wagner 
clean. (Id.) Wagner would take M.P. into a utility room and commit lewd acts. 
(Id.) Wagner would commit these lewd acts while M.P.'s father was just outside 
in the car. (Id.) Wagner would also molest M.P. at her house, while others were 
in and around the house. (Id.) 
The state moved into introduce evidence of Wagner's previous conviction 
for molesting a 9 year old girl at a Walmart in Norfolk, Virginia in 1997. (Supp. 
R., pp. 56-60.) A 9 year old girl, M.W., was separated from her parents and 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the underlying criminal case. (R., p. 52.) 
The record on appeal was supplemented with documents from the underlying 
criminal case. The appellant references these documents as "Supp." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 1, n.1) To avoid confusion, respondent will use the same 
reference designations. 
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Wagner, who did not know M.W., grabbed her and stuck his hand up her dress 
and grabbed her vaginal area. (Supp., R., pp. 57-58.) M.W. cried and ran for 
help, but security could not find Wagner. (Id.) M.W.'s family continued 
shopping. (Id.) Wagner again approached M.W. and again grabbed her vaginal 
area. (Id.) He was later identified and charged with aggravated sexual battery. 
(Id.) He pied guilty and served time in prison. (Id.) 
The state sought to introduce this evidence at trial because it 
demonstrated a unique plan or scheme. (Supp. R., p. 59.) As the state pointed 
out, most incidents of sexual abuse occur after a period of grooming, 
manipulation and purposeful acts to create false boundaries between the 
offender and the child. (Supp. R, pp. 58-59.) Wagner, in contrast, did none of 
these things, but instead committed impulsive sexual abuse in highly public 
settings with a high probability of detection. (Id.) 
Wagner and the state agreed to a plea deal. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 4, L. 5 - p. 6, 
L. 12.) Wagner agreed to plead guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct with a 
Minor Under Sixteen, and the state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and 
would dismiss the sex offender enhancement. (Id.) The state also agreed to 
limit its recommendation to 10 years fixed followed by 20 years indeterminate. 
(Id.) 
Wagner and his counsel read and signed the Guilty Plea Advisory Form. 
(Supp. R., pp. 64-70, 1/31/11 Tr., p. 7, L. 20 - p. 8, L. 7.) The district court 
conducted a lengthy plea colloquy with Wagner. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 8, L. 18 - p. 20, 
L. 24.) During the plea colloquy Wagner repeatedly admitted to committing lewd 
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acts on M.P. (Id.) Wagner even corrected the district court regarding the time 
frame for the abuse. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 18, Ls. 1-14.) The state provided a factual 
basis for the Lewd Conduct charge, and Wagner admitted the basis was true. 
(1/31/11 Tr., p. 19, L. 14 - p. 20, L. 23.) 
In his presentence investigation questionnaire, Wagner again admitted he 
committed lewd acts against M.P. (PSI, p. 4.) Wagner wrote in part, "I brought 
her to work with me. At the end of the night, I gave her a massage. I then began 
rubbing my penis on her but [sic]. I got a conscience and stopped." (Id.) The 
presentence investigation revealed that Wagner has a history of repeated sexual 
assaults against young girls. (PSI, pp. 2-4, 10-11, 15-17.) Most of his assaults 
were impulsive assaults in public with a high probability of discovery. (Id.) 
At Wagner's sentencing, Wagner's defense counsel argued that Wagner 
took responsibility for crime and felt guilty for what he did to M.P. (4/4/11 Tr., p. 
36, L. 17 - p. 37, L. 4.) He argued that Wagner wanted to get help and was 
willing to participate in the psychosexual evaluation so he could address his 
sexual problems. (4/4/11 Tr., p. 38, L. 10 - p. 39, L. 13, p. 40.) Wagner's 
counsel argued: 
Again, I reiterate his accountability, his remorse, his willingness to 
cooperate with this process and obtain a psychosexual evaluation, 
really against my advice. 
(4/4/11 Tr., p. 40, Ls. 20-23.) When the district court asked Wagner if he had 
anything to say, he responded, "No, I'm just sorry." (4/4/11 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 4-6.) 
The district court imposed a lesser sentence than the state's 
recommendation. (4/4/11 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 3-5.) The district court imposed a 
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sentence of eight years fixed followed by 22 years indeterminate for a 30-year 
sentence. (Supp. R., pp. 77-79) Wagner did not appeal from the judgment of 
conviction. (R., p. 5.) 
Wagner filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief and a 
motion for the appointment of counsel. (R., pp. 4-20.) The state answered 
Wagner's Petition and filed a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 26-36.) 
The state's motion was supported by an affidavit from Wagner's trial counsel, 
Anthony Geddes. (R., pp. 37-38.) 
In response, Wagner filed a Motion to Amend his Post Conviction Petition, 
in which he again requested counsel. (R., pp. 39-40.) The district court 
appointed counsel. (R., pp. 41-42.) Wagner filed a Memorandum in Support of 
Petitioner's Objection to Respondent's Motion to Summarily Dismiss Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp. 54-59.) The state organized Wagner's 
allegations into four claims. (R., pp. 29-36.) Wagner agreed that his allegations 
should be organized into four claims. (R., pp. 54-59.) Claim 1-Trial counsel 
failed to file an appeal; Claim 2-Trial counsel was ineffective regarding the 
potential admissibility of Wagner's prior criminal record at trial and sentencing; 
Claim 3-Trial counsel was ineffective for not forcing the prosecutor to show 
evidence of a crime and failing to uncover evidence that the victim was being 
untruthful about the abuse; and Claim 4-Trial counsel did not file a Rule 35 
motion. (R., p. 55-59, see also 7/17/13 Tr., p. 2, L. 18 - p. 4, L. 12.) 
In his memorandum, Wagner did not object to the dismissal of claims 1 
and 4. (R., pp. 55-59.) At the hearing on the state's motion to dismiss, Wagner 
4 
clarified Claim 2 and conceded it did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, but he still requested an evidentiary hearing. (7/17/13 Tr., p. 6, L 15 
- p. 7, L. 20.) Wagner also conceded that prior criminal history would be the 
type of information that the district court would consider at sentencing. (7 /17 /13 
Tr., p. 6, L. 15 - p. 7, L. 1.) For Claim 3, Wagner admitted that he used a private 
investigator to investigate the claims, but the private investigator was unable to 
find information that was beneficial to the claim. (7/17/13 Tr., p. 8, L. 3 - p. 9, L. 
3, see also R., p. 57.) 
The district court filed a Notice of Intent to Dismiss. (R., pp. 64-72.) The 
district court determined that Wagner was not entitled to post-conviction relief 
and granted Wagner 20 days to reply to the proposed dismissal of his four 
claims. (R., pp. 71-72.) Regarding Claim 2, Wagner's prior record claim, the 
district court determined it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for Wagner's 
trial counsel to not object to the district court's review of Wagner's prior record 
during sentencing. (R., p. 69.) The district court also rejected Wagner's 
argument that his plea was not voluntary and lacked a factual basis. (R., pp. 69-
70.) 
In response, Wagner submitted the following affidavit: 
1. I was the Defendant in case numbered CR FE 2010 0017627. 
The facts stated hereinafter are true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief; 
2. My Trial Counsel told me my prior criminal record would cause 
me to lose at jury trial. 
3. I only plead guilty because Trial Counsel told me I would lose at 
jury trial. 
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4. Trial Counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison if I 
lost at trial. 
5. I believe the victim would have recanted at trial if she were 
subjected to cross examination. 
6. I would have asked the case be tried to a jury, but Trial Counsel 
advised me I would lose because of my prior record. 
7. Trial Counsel did not advise me to lie at my entry of plea, but he told 
me the court would not accept my plea if the questions were not 
answered properly. 
8. I am factually innocent of the crimes for which I was charged and 
convicted. 
(R., pp. 73-74.) The district court entered an order dismissing Wagner's post-
conviction petition. (R., pp. 76-77.) The district court noted that Wagner's 
affidavit "contains bare and conclusory statements that were addressed in the 
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss." (R., p. 76.) Wagner appeals this decision. 
(R., pp. 78-79.) Specifically, Wagner appeals the dismissal of Claim 2-that 
Wagner's trial counsel was ineffective because he incorrectly told Wagner that 
his prior criminal record would be admitted at trial and he would be found guilty 
because of that criminal record. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-9.) 
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ISSUES 
Wagner states the issues on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's 
petition for post conviction relief even though he presented evidence 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 




Wagner Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Dismissing His Post-
Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by dismissing 
Wagner's post-conviction petition for ineffective assistance of counsel. Wagner 
argues that but for his counsel's deficient performance he would not have 
accepted the plea deal and pied guilty to Lewd Conduct with a Minor under the 
Age of 16. 
Wagner failed to show his trial counsel's performance was deficient or 
that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel's performance. He failed to show his 
guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily made. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, the appellate court 
applies the same standards utilized by the trial courts and examines whether the 
petitioner's admissible evidence asserts facts which, if true, would entitle the 
petitioner to relief. Gutierrez-Medina v. State, 157 Idaho 34, _, 333 P.3d 849, 
851 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 
929 (2010)). 
C. Wagner Failed To Show His Trial Counsel Was Deficient In His 
Performance And That This Deficiency Resulted In Prejudice 
Wagner argues that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently 
made because of the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp. 7-8) A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
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counsel must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and that 
this deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 
P.2d 424 (1989)). To establish deficient performance the petitioner must 
overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel performed within the wide 
range of professional assistance by proving trial counsel's actions fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382, 
247 P.3d 582, 609 (2010); Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 
286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 
1989). To meet this burden "requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the 
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). The applicant bears a heavy burden in proving that his attorney's 
performance was deficient. Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775 P.2d at 1248. 
To satisfy the prejudice element, where the petitioner was convicted upon 
a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pied guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial. Popoca-Garcia v. State, 157 Idaho 150, _, 334 P.3d 824, 826 
(Ct. App. 2014) (citing Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 762, 152 P.3d 629, 633 (Ct. 
App. 2006)). Wagner fails both prongs. 
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1. Wagner Failed To Overcome the Strong Presumption That His Trial 
Counsel's Performance Fell Below An Objective Standard Of 
Reasonableness 
On appeal, Wagner makes two arguments why he now believes his 
counsel's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8.) First, Wagner argues that his counsel's advice that 
he needed to plead guilty because the state's 404(b) evidence would be 
admitted at trial was objectively unreasonable. (Id.) Second, Wagner argues 
that his counsel told him that if he went to trial he would be sentenced to life in 
prison, and this advice was also objectively unreasonable. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
9.) Both of Wagner's arguments are without merit. 
a. Wagner Failed To Establish That His Counsel's Advice 
Regarding His Prior Criminal Record Was Deficient 
Wagner's argument, that his counsel gave him incorrect advice regarding 
his prior record fails for three reasons. First, it fails because Wagner conceded it 
below. Second, the argument fails because Wagner failed to introduce sufficient 
admissible evidence in support of this argument. And third, the advice was not 
incorrect because evidence of Wagner's prior conviction could potentially be 
introduced at trial. 
First, during oral argument on the motion to dismiss his post-conviction 
petition, Wagner explained and then conceded the claim regarding the use of his 
prior criminal history at trial. (7/17/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 15 - p. 7, L. 20.) 
But I think the way I explained it in terms of interpreting the pro se 
petition that's been filed before Your Honor was that Mr. Geddes 
said that you would be facing a much worse outcome and that you 
can't take the case to trial because of your prior history. And I think 
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what my client heard was: I won't case [sic] the case to trial, and 
you need to plead guilty and accept this offer. 
At least that's the way he has explained it to me. I realize that, in 
and of itself, isn't grounds for ineffective assistance of course. But 
that's certainly the way Mr. Wagner would want anyone reading his 
affidavit and petition to appreciate the nature of the allegation he is 
making. 
(7/17/13 Tr., p. 7, Ls. 2-14.) Wagner conceded the claim regarding his prior 
criminal history, as he sees it, is not grounds for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Second, Wagner also failed to provide sufficient evidence to show his trial 
counsel gave him erroneous advice regarding the admissibility of the 404(b) 
evidence. Bare assertions and speculations, unsupported by specific facts are 
not sufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Idaho App. 1994) Wagner filed affidavits 
that claimed that his trial counsel: 
[D]id not argue to keep a 13 year old Felony conviction from being 
used against me. Further he allowed the prosecuting attorney to 
rely solely upon my criminal record for a conviction rather than any 
evidence in the present case. 
(R. p. 9.) 
My Trial Counsel told me my prior criminal record would cause me 
to lose at jury trial. 
(R. p. 73.) These statements are bare assertions unsupported by specific facts 
and are insufficient to show his trial counsel's performance was deficient in 
regards to the admissibility of Wagner's prior convictions. 
Third, Wagner's trial counsel did not provide objectively unreasonable 
advice. There is no evidence the advice was based upon inadequate 
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preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or another objective shortcoming. See 
Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145, 139 P.3d 741, 747 (Idaho App. 2006). 
Wagner's trial counsel was properly concerned about the possibility that 
evidence related to Wagner's prior conviction would be introduced at trial. The 
state moved pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) to introduce evidence of 
Wagner's previous conviction for impulsively molesting M.W., a 9 year old girl, in 
public at a Walmart. (Supp. R., pp. 56-60.) It was likely that the district court 
would have admitted the previous conviction because it meets the two-tiered 
analysis laid out in State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). 
Contrary to Wagner's argument on appeal, Wager's prior conviction is 
admissible for something more than mere propensity because, unlike the 
"typical" sex assault on young children, Wagner did not engage in any grooming 
type behavior but instead sexually assaulted children in public or quasi-public 
settings with a high degree of visibility in what appeared to be an almost 
impulsive manner. (Supp., R., p. 57-58.) These can form the basis of a 
"common scheme or plan." (Supp., R., pp. 56-60.) Wagner's trial counsel acted 
objectively reasonably by warning Wagner about the dangers of this 404(b) 
evidence and the problems it would present Wagner at trial. Wagner's defense 
counsel's performance was not deficient. 
b. Wagner Failed To Establish His Trial Counsel Unreasonably 
Advised Him That He Would Be Sentenced To Life In Prison 
If He Went To Trial 
Wagner argues that his counsel told him that if he went to trial he would 
be sentenced to life in prison, and this advice was also objectively unreasonable. 
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(Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, Wagner did 
not present sufficient evidence to support this argument and second, Wagner's 
trial counsel was correct to be concerned about the potential of a life sentence 
considering Wagner's prior record. 
Wagner offers a single conculsory sentence in support of this argument. 
After the district court issued the Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp. 64-72), 
Wagner filed an affidavit with the following sentence, "Trial counsel told me I 
would be sentenced to life in prison if I lost at trial." (R., p. 73.) This single 
sentence is the totality of evidence presented by Wagner to the district court on 
this argument. As noted above, bare assertions and speculations, unsupported 
by specific facts are not sufficient to show ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Roman, 125 Idaho at 649, 873 P.2d at 903. 
Second, Wagner's trial counsel was right to be concerned about the 
possibility of a life sentence if Wagner lost at trial. Wagner has a horrific record 
of repeated child sexual abuse. (See PSI, pp. 3-11, 15-17.) He is designated a 
"violent sexual offender" and is nearly three times as likely as the typical sexual 
offender to re-offend. (See id.) At his sentencing hearing Wagner argued that 
he was taking responsibility for his actions and was amenable to treatment 
because of that accountability. 
This is a case that he chose not to take to trial, not to put [M.P.] 
through the rigors and embarrassment and fear of a trial. He did 
take accountability, and as he states in the presentence 
investigation report, he felt guilty about what he was doing, and he 
stopped before there was penetration. He said he got a conscience 
and felt guilty about what he was doing. 
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(4/4/11 Tr., p. 36, L. 21 - p. 37, L. 4.) If had gone to trial, and was convicted, he 
would have undermined this sole piece of mitigation, and it is possible he would 
be have been sentenced to life. Wagner failed to prove his trial counsel's advice 
was deficient. 
2. Wagner Failed To Show A Reasonable Probability He Would Have 
Not Pied Guilty And Demanded A Jury Trial 
Wagner cannot show that he was prejudiced by any of his trial counsel's 
alleged errors. To satisfy the prejudice element, Wagner must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pied 
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Popoca-Garcia, 157 Idaho 
at, _, 334 P.3d at 826 (citing Plant, 143 Idaho at 762, 152 P.3d at 633). 
Wagner argues that if not for the unreasonable performance of his counsel he 
would have demanded a jury trial. (R., pp. 9-10.) Wagner's argument is not 
supported by sufficient evidence in the record. 
The only evidence presented by Wagner in support of his claim is a 
sentence in an affidavit filed after the district court issued the Notice of Intent to 
Dismiss. (R., p. 74.) The sentence reads, "I would have asked the case be tried 
to a jury, but Trial Counsel advised me I would lose because of my prior record." 
(R., p. 74.) No other evidence was introduced to support this conclusory 
statement. 
In contrast, there is evidence that Wagner would have pied guilty. The 
state had a strong case and credible victim. The State's initial plea offer was a 
life sentence with 10 years fixed, but Wagner's trial counsel negotiated a 30 year 
sentence with 10 fixed. (R., p. 38.) During his extensive plea colloquy, Wagner 
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admitted he had been thinking about pleading guilty for a while. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 
12, L. 15 - p. 13, L. 4.) Wagner also stated that he was satisfied with his trial 
counsel's representation. (1/31/11 Tr., p. 14, L. 7 - p. 15, L. 2.) During his 
change of plea, pre-sentence investigation, psychosexual evaluation and 
sentencing hearing, Wagner admitted to molesting M.P. and repeatedly 
expressed guilt and remorse molesting M.P. (See 1/31/11 Tr., p. 18, L. 1 - p. 
20, L. 23, 4/4/2011 Tr., p. 42, Ls. 1-6, PSI, p. 4.) Wagner failed to show that he 
would not have pied guilty and asked for a jury trial absent his counsel alleged 
deficient performance. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this court affirm the district court's 
dismissal of Wagner's post-conviction petition. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2014. 
~ Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of November, 2014, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in 
the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
TST/pm 
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